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sessed. It can now do indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., interfere with,
and even defeat entirely, a federal lien.
Mr. Justice White began the conclusion of his dissent by writing:
"Finally, the federal revenue deserves more protection than it receives
today!"40 He viewed the majority's decision as an invitation for more
taxpayers to invest in life insurance policies and to obtain bank loans by
pledging them. The harm of such an invitation is, however, not so real
as it may appear. It is to the advantage of the vast majority of married
taxpayers to file joint tax returns. As a result of this practice, generally
both the husband and the wife are individually liable for the full amount of
any tax deficiency.
The majority opinion must be read as holding that the New York
statute makes marshaling inequitable as to all those under its protection.
As pointed out above, 47 New York extends its statutory shield to all third
party beneficiaries regardless of their relationship to the insured. The
Commissioner would receive comfort if Meyer could be viewed as illustrative
that widows, as well as sureties, are the "darlings of the court." However,
this solace is not available to him.
CHARLES BRADFORD ABBOTT
Federal Jurisdiction---"Federal Common Law" vs. State Law.—United
States v. Sovimerville. 1—The Farmers Home Administration (FHA), an
agency of the Department of Agriculture, made loans2 over a four year
period to Flickinger, which were secured in part by certain livestock. A
security agreement, which stated that it was "intended by the parties to
serve as both 'Financing Statement' and 'Security Agreement' under Penn-
sylvania law," was executed and the security interest perfected in accord-
ance with the laws of that state .2 Nine months after the security agreement
was duly filed as a financing statement, Flickinger delivered three of his
cows to the defendant for sale at the latter's auction. The plaintiff did not
know of this delivery or consent to it, and the defendant-auctioneer did not
have actual knowledge* of the Government's security interest in the live-
stock. The three cows were sold at the defendant's auction, and the purchase
money, less commissions, was turned over to Flickinger. Upon learning of
this sale, FHA urged Flickinger to liquidate all of his assets, which he did.
The proceeds were then applied to the balance of the loans leaving a debt
slightly in excess of five-hundred dollars. Plaintiff, on behalf of FHA,
96 Meyer v. United States, supra note 1, at 246.
47 See note 33, supra.
1 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963).
2 The loans were made in compliance with the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant
Act, 60 Stat. 1071, et seq. (1946), 7 U.S.C. 1007, et seq. (1958), now 75 Stat. 310,
et seq. (1961), 7 U.S.C. 1941, et seq. (1963).
3 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 12A 9-101 et seq. (Uniform Commercial Code).
4 An auctioneer is the agent of the owner of the property to be sold, and is guilty
of conversion if the principal has no title to the property, even though the agent
acts without knowledge of the title defect. Restatement (Second), Agency § 349 (1959).
790
CASE NOTES
brought an action in conversion against defendant to recover the value of
the livestock sold by him at auction. The district court held that the action was
governed by Pennsylvania law and determined that defendant was liable.
On appeal the Third Circuit affirmed the decision but reversed the basis of
the holding. HELD: An independant federal rule must be applied when a
genuine federal interest would be subjected to disparate state laws. The
majority found this federal interest to exist and concluded that because
the loan program could otherwise be adversely affected, a necessity for
uniformity was present. 5
Whether or not federal common law should be applied to certain con-
troversies requires an examination of the history of the specific problem. °
The first important decision was Swift v. Tyson,' where the Supreme Court
held that if the rights to be decided were general rather than local in nature,
then "general law", rather than state law, could be used by the federal courts
to guide their decision. Under this doctrine, if the state law was not
beneficial to the party, he could move to another state and then commence
an action in a federal court that would apply the "general law" which could
be more beneficial.° This thwarted the purposes of the administration of
state law.
In 1938, the Swift-Tyson doctrine was overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins,° where the Court stated that federal courts are bound on a state
matter by state law. The Court also broadly stated that "there is no federal
general common law."" This ruling declared that Congress has no power
to declare substantive rules to be applicable in a state whether or not the
issue is local or general in nature. Subsequently this decision was not inter-
preted to mean that there was no "federal common law" in all instances. In
one case, involving a contract action against the United States, a federal
district court held that Erie could not have meant that the Government's
rights were to be undermined and henceforth determined by the individual
state laws in cases where the circumstances show a need for uniformity."
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit went even further in under-
mining the Erie decision by stating, " [T] here still exist certain fields—and
this [interstate communications] is one where legal relations are governed
by a 'federal common law', a body of decisional law developed by the
federal courts."" In 1943, the Supreme Court in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United Statesn clarified under what circumstances, if any, Erie was to be
5 It should be pointed out that although the U.C.C. is the Pennsylvania statute
involved, the Court of Appeals decision is meant to apply to any state rule of law,
and therefore, the decision here is not determined by the Code.
6 The problem may be looked at as one in the field of conflicts of law, i.e., which
law should be applied, state or federal? However, the problem will be treated here
as one involving the scope and jurisdiction of "federal common law."
7 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
8 Black and White Taxicab and Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
9 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
To Id. at 78.
11 Byron Jackson Co. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Calif. 1940).
12 O'Brien v. Western Union Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1940).
73 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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followed. Certiorari had been granted"' because of a conflict in the decisions
of the circuit courts."'
In Clearfield, a check was drawn on the Treasurer of the United States
to the order of Barner for services rendered to the Works Progress Admin-
istration (WPA), an agency of the federal government. Barner did not
receive the check, and an unknown person forged his endorsement. The
check was cashed- at J. C. Penny Company in Pennsylvania and turned over
to the Clearfield Trust for collection. The United States honored the check,
but when the forgery was subsequently discovered, the United States com-
menced action on Clearfield's express guaranty of prior endorsements. The
Supreme Court held that the Erie rule did not apply to this action and that
state law was inapplicable. Said the Court:
We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the rule of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, . . . does not apply to this action. The
rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which
it issues are governed by federal rather than local law. When
the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is exer-
cising a constitutional function or power. This check was issued
for services performed under the Federal Emergency Relief Act
of 1935. . . . The authority to issue the check had its origin in
the Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in
no way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other State.
Cf. Board of Commissioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343
[ (1939)] ; Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289
[(1941)]. The duties imposed upon the United States and the
rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in
the same federal sources."'
The Court further stated that in certain instances'° the applicable
federal rule will be selected by state law. These instances depend on the
circumstances of the case. In United States v. Brosnan," the Court con-
cluded that state law was appropriate to govern the divestiture of federal
tax liens and adopted it as a proper expression of federal law. However, in
Clearfield the application of disparate state laws would "subject the rights
and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty [and] lead to
great diversity in results by making identical transactions subject to the
vagaries of the laws of the several states., The desirability of a uniform
rule is plain." 19
As a result of the Clearfield case, the Swift-Tyson doctrine has been
revived to allow the federal courts to apply federal rules where there is a
federal issue. However, the Court in Clearfield goes one step further by
14 317 U.S. 619 (1942).
18 Security-First Nat. Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1939). This
case presented a fact situation identical to the Clearfield case, but was decided contra to
the later Third Circuit decision in Clearfield.
16 Supra note 13, at 366.
1r Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941).
18 363 U.S. 237 (1960).
19 Supra note 13, at 367.
792
CASE NOTES
providing an exception to the general rule. Where the federal interest is not
vital or necessary to the federal program involved, or where Congress has
not indicated a desire to displace state laws, the federal common law will
not be applicable. It would appear that Clearfield has started a new concept
in the field of federal law besides renewing some old pre-Erie principles."
While attempting to clear up the, muddle which the Erie decision created,
the Supreme Court in Clearfield also created somewhat of an undecidable
issue: What is a vital federal issue necessitating a uniform federal rule which
displaces disparate state laws? However, this issue does not arise unless the
authority of the Government is in no way dependent upon the laws of a
state. In Clearfield, the Court noted that the authority to issue the check
was in no way dependent on Pennsylvania laws.21
The Third Circuit in United States v. Sommerville 22 is the fourth circuit
to decide on exactly the same factual situation. Two circuits now hold that
the FHA loan program involves such a vital federal interest that federal
common law should govern the rights of the parties, and two other circuits
hold that there is no federal interest in this program that calls for a dis-
placement of state law.23 Until the Sommerville decision (3d Cir.) only
United States v. Matthews 24 (9th Cir.) held that transactions under the
Bankhead-Jones Act25 were governed by "the federal common law."
The court in the Sommerville case uses the Clearfield decision as its
authority for holding that "an independent federal rule of decision must
be applied when a genuine federal interest would be subjected to uncertainty
by application of disparate state rules."28 It devises a test consisting of two
major premises: (1) If there is a federal interest present, then formulate
a federal rule. (2) If there is a necessity for uniformity, then state law
should not be used in formulating that federal rule. It is in the formulation
of this test that the present court misinterprets the Clear field case. Clearfield
established the rule that where a federal interest was present the federal
common law governs the situation, but only if there was necessity for uni-
formity, and if . the Government's authority was not dependent on the state
law.
Because the Government is a party to the action or because a federal
program is involved is not enough to set aside state laws. There must be
some basis rooted in federal law. In United States v. Matthews 27 (9th Cir.)
an identical fact situation brought about the same decision. However, the
20 See 45 Calif. L. Rev. 212 (1957).
21 Supra note 13, at 366.
22 Supra note 1.
23 Application for certiorari is now pending in the Supreme Court. In the accom-
panying memorandum for respondent, the United States, the following is written:
"Although we believe that the decision below is correct, we do not oppose the petition.
The decision is in conflict with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
and Eighth Circuits and the issue presented is a recurrent one." The Ninth and Third
Circuits hold the other way.
24 244 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1957).
26 Supra note 2.
26 Supra note 1, at 714-15.
27 Supra note 24.
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court stated it was not necessary to discuss why the federal rule should be
applied, because the parties had agreed in the litigation that it did apply.'
Another more recent decision23 from the same circuit held that the rights
under a government contract affecting national security must be decided
uniformly by federal law. 3° It is significant to note that although the
principal decision agrees with the result of the Matthews case, that case was
not cited as authority for its decision. This suggests that the court recognized
that Matthews could be distinguished in that there was no issue as to which
law should be applied.
Therefore, Sommerville is the first case which actually holds that rights
under the Bankhead-Jones Act should be decided by federal rules regardless
of the appropriate state law. The court did not point out where the statute
indicated an intent to formulate such a uniform federal rule in these cases.
In Clearfield, the authority to apply the federal rules was based on the basic
right of the Government to issue checks or drafts on the United States Treas-
ury. However, in Sommerville, there is no federally based right of the
Government to determine where the legal possession of personal property
belongs. This right of possession arises by state law, and should be deter-
mined by such unless changed by federal legislation.
In accord with this view are the Fourth and Eighth Circuits which have
held that the rights of the parties to a security agreement under the Bank-
head-Jones Act should be governed by the laws of the state where the trans-
action occurs. United States v. Krameln held that the Erie doctrine, de-
claring that there is no "federal common law," does not apply except in
instances where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
Although in Sommerville federal jurisdiction is not based on diversity 32 as
was Kramel, federal law should not be applied except where necessary or
except in those cases where the federal court is concededly enunciating a
federal rule, but in doing so is free to select from the laws of the states.
The court in Kramel went on to state that there must be a dear legislative
intent to displace state law in such a broad fashion.83 It appears that this
court does not want to go so far as to say that there is no federal common
law, thus concluding that the federal rule to be applied must be taken from
the state law.
The most recent case involving secured property under the Bankhead-
Jones Act,84 which holds state law as applicable, is United States v. Union
28 Id. at 633. Circuit Judge Pope, concurring, specially states that this decision
need not be in conflict with United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956)
because here the decision is the same under state and federal laws, and the court need
not decide which is applicable.
28 American Pipe Sr Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d 640
(9th Cir. 1961).
80 This case involved two private parties, but the court held that the Government
was affected by the outcome.
31 Supra note 28.
32 Jurisdiction in the Sommerville case is based on 62 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
1345 (1958) which authorizes the United States to sue in the District Court.
33 United States v. Kramel, supra note 28, at 581.
34 This Act authorized operating loans for farmers through the FHA. The purpose
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Livestock Sales Co." There the court reasoned that state law governs "where
transfers of private property are made by the owners in accordance with
state law in the course of business transactions." 3° Here Clearfield was used
for the proposition that state law governs where the Government places itself
in a position where its rights necessarily are determinable by state law. In
speaking of the Bankhead-Jones Act, they say: "These provisions seem to
us to carry the unmistakable import that the nature and effect of the Govern-
ment's security interest under a chattel mortgage is to be subject to the
applicable recording laws, and the fair inference is that the Government's
rights with respect to third persons are to be determined in accordance with
the local law.""
It seems that from the Kramel and Union Livestock cases, the determina-
tive factors are: under what law did the rights of the parties arise, and what
necessity has been shown which justifies displacement of state law for
"federal common law." The court in Sommerville overlooks the first factor,
and finds necessity while ignoring an obvious contrary intent of the legis-
lature." The ramification of these decisions is far-reaching in that any of the
millions of citizens doing business under one of these federal programs may
be subject to a "foreign" rule, or even worse may not know what rule, state
or federal, will be applied to the transaction. For example, under the majority
decision in Sommerville, with the security interest arising from the federal
statute, there would be no need to file in order to perfect the security interest
even in a Uniform Commercial Code state. What would then happen to a
subsequent creditor, who without knowledge of the Government's security
interest, perfects his interest in the same property in accordance with state
law? In cases where the vital federal interest is apparent or uniformity is
obviously needed," the courts have no trouble. The difficulties arise when
the courts are not sure whether a federal interest is present, and whether that
interest is vital enough to displace state law."
In the Sommerville case, there is evidence of a legislative policy as
revealed in the Bankhead-Jones Farm Act,'" that state law should govern
of it is to allow farmers to operate their farms with the greatest efficiency by borrowing
money at low interest rates. The Act calls for security in all equipment and livestock.
35 298 F.2d 755 (4th Cir. 1962).
86 Id. at 758.
87 Id. at 759. The regulations of the Department of Agriculture governing the ad-
ministration of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 6 C.F.R. 342.3(g). (Supp. 1958)
provides in part:
Form FHA-31, "Promissory Note." The applicant's spouse will be required to
execute Form FHA-31 when legally required by State Law, or the loan approval
official determines that the signature is needed because of the spouse's interest
in the farm being operated or in property offered as security or it is deter-
mined by the State Director, on a state basis, that the spouse's signature will be
required.
83 Supra note 1, at 716.
se Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301 (1947); United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
40 United States v. Ferguson, 158 F. Supp. 814 (ED. Ark. 1958). See also cases
cited supra notes 24, 31 and 35.
41 See supra note 37.
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the rights and liabilities of the parties. Courts have held that even where no
policy is stated, considered with all the other circumstances, congressional
silence should indicate the desire to keep state law as the determinative body
of rules. 42
 The perfected security interest held by the United States was
created under the laws of Pennsylvania. Because the rights and interests of
the parties are created by state law, that same law should also decide the
liabilities and obligations. If Congress felt that the loan program under the
Bankhead-Jones Act would be hampered, then it could have provided for a
security interest based on a federal right. The court in Sommerville saw a
federal interest and twisted the Clearfield doctrine to fit their decision. It
disregarded two well reasoned opinions," and relied heavily on a decision
for which no. reason was given," because whether federal or state law
should be applied was not there in issue. Even though the result would be
the same whether federal or state law was applied in the main case, the
importance of this decision is not lessened. The next case involving a secu-
rity agreement or chattel mortgage held by the United States under the
FHA Loan Program might call for a different result under the appropriate
state law.
ROBERT I. DEUTSCH
Insurance—Pre-Existing Disease—Insurer's Contractual Liability in
Accident Policies.—Miles v. Continental Cos. Co, 1—Plaintiff-benefici-
ary brought an action for recovery under a Health and Accident Policy
which provided for the payment of $5,000 for death from "bodily injury
caused by accident" and "resulting directly and independently of all other
causes."2 Decedent-insured had accidentally sustained a fracture of his left
femur, and subsequent X-rays revealed the presence of cancerous growth
in the immediate area of the injury. Medical testimony disclosed that: (1)
the cancer was malignant, metastatic, and present in the area prior to the
fracture rather than trauma induced; (2) the cancer was active and not
dormant, and would have caused the insured's death irrespective of the
fracture; (3) although the fracture itself could not directly and independ-
42 United States v. Kramel, supra note 28, at 581.
48 Supra notes 31 and 35.
44 Supra note 28.
— Wyo. —, 386 P.2d 720 (1963).
2 Although the court characterized it as an "Accident and Health Policy," Conti-
nental Casualty Company classified the contract as a "Business and Professional Dis-
ability Policy." The two relevant clauses are as follows: '
(1) Definition of injury
"Injury" wherever used in this policy means bodily injury caused by
accident occurring while this policy is in force and resulting directly and
independently of all other causes in loss covered by this policy.
(2) Death provision
When injury results in loss of life of the Insured within 100 days
after the date of the accident the Company will pay the Loss of Life
Accident Indemnity stated in the Schedule.
It should be noted that the company had previously paid claims under the policy for
hospitalization, medical treatment, and per diem expenses.
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